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ABSTRACT Cognitive radio is more than just radio environment awareness, and more importantly, has
the ability to interact with the environment in the best way possible. Ideally, cognitive radios will form
a self-regulating society of mobile radios achieving maximum spectrum utilization. However, challenges
arise as mobile radios tend to compete with one another for spectrum, generating harmful interference, and
damaging performance individually and for the network as a whole. In this paper, we present a framework
that allows competing radios to teach and learn from each other’s action so that a desirable equilibrium
can be reached. The heart of cognition to establish this is the forward-looking ability, which enables
competing radios to see beyond the present time, negotiate and optimize their actions toward amore agreeable
equilibrium. Technically speaking, we adopt a belief-directed game where each mobile radio, regarded as
player, formulates a belief function to project how the radio environment as a whole would respond to any
of its action. This model facilitates engineering of the equilibrium by different choices of the players’ belief
functions. Under this model, players will negotiate naturally through a sequence of calculated competition
(i.e., cycles of teaching and learning with each other). We apply this methodology to a cognitive orthogonal
frequency-divisionmultiple-access radio network wheremobile users are free to access any of the subcarriers
and thus compete for radio resources tomaximize their rates. The results reveal that the proposed negotiation-
by-forward-looking competition mechanism guides users to converge to an equilibrium that benefits not only
the individual users but the entire network approaching the maximum achievable sum-rate.
INDEX TERMS Cognitive radios, negotiation mechanism, noncooperative game theory, OFDMA.
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been nearly 20 years since Mitola and Maguire’s
seminal work on cognitive radio in 1999 [1]. Since then,
there have been huge amount of efforts in bringing advances
in enabling technologies for software defined radio (SDR)
including radio frequency, analog to digital conversion and
digital signal processing, see [2], and the visionary paper [3]
looking forward to the next 20 years of SDR. Recent advances
have further witnessed cognitive radio being applied to mas-
sive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) antenna sys-
tems [4], Internet-of-Things (IoT) [5], [6] and non-orthogonal
multiple-access (NOMA) systems [7].
Cognitive radio, the ideal software radio or Mitola radio,
indeed goes much beyond the anticipated hardware flexibility
and possesses the intelligence to access the spectrum anytime
anywhere according to the environment and its need. Accord-
ing to Mitola’s description [8], cognitive radio is:
‘‘The point in which wireless personal digital assis-
tants (PDAs) and the related networks are sufficiently com-
putationally intelligent about radio resources and related
computer-to-computer communications to detect user com-
munications needs as a function of use context, and to provide
radio resources and wireless services most appropriate to
those needs.’’
Giving cognitive radio the required intelligence appears
to be the obstacle. The authors of the famous article [9]
commented that the fact that an incumbent not fully willing
to cooperate with cognitive radio has been the reason that
forbids bringing cognitive radio to fruition. This suggests
that some form of cooperation between mobile radios be
necessary, if they are to coexist and occupy the same spec-
trum. Cooperation unfortunately implies overhead, cost and
worse, restrictions as well as rigidity. There is a growing
opinion that cognitive radio may never reach the required
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level of intelligence to coexist without one form of cooper-
ation or another, dampening the prospect of the concept. This
school of thought is clear from a vast amount of literature, see
the most recent papers, e.g., [10]–[17].
In [10], the primary spectrum owner needs to run an auc-
tion to lease out its idle channels to the secondary users (SUs).
Later, the work in [11] looked at self-coexistence for several
secondary systems and adopted a congestion-averse game for
a decentralized approach after a number of approximations
and simplifications. The approach is also not entirely decen-
tralized because a pricing model is assumed to exist for use
of the resources. In enhancing the environment awareness,
[12] proposed to deploy sensor nodes at different locations
and employ deep learning to optimise the transmit power of
a cognitive radio given the sensing information. Relying on
the presence of sensor nodes to aid cognitive radio is however
unrealistic, let alone the bandwidth needed for communica-
tion between sensor nodes and the cognitive radio. In [13],
historical behavior of the primary users (PUs) was utilized
to maximize the throughput of a cognitive SU network but
a centralized coordinator was needed to maintain a reliable
historical record for the behavior of the PUs. On the other
hand, [14] considered a slotted ALOHA system and proposed
a fair medium access control (MAC) protocol for cognitive
radio networks but a common control channel was assumed
to be available to all SUs. Setting up a control channel for
the SUs was also recently investigated in [15]. Moreover,
deep neural network (DNN) was used to address the resource
allocation problem for cognitive radio networks but DNN had
to be operated in a centralized fashion [16]. A framework
for cooperative spectrum sensing and resource allocation for
cognitive IoT systems was presented in [17].
Despite the lack of intelligence harmonizing competition,
game theory remains the most used mathematical tool to
design autonomous access control methods for cognitive
radio networks, as it is the tool to analyze the outcome
from a group of competing and rational players, as is the
case for cognitive radio environments composed of com-
peting interference-generating radios [18]–[34]. In interfer-
ence channels like cognitive radio networks, users are decen-
tralized and uncoordinated by default, compete and inter-
fere with each other. How a cognitive radio gathers suffi-
cient network-wide information and optimize itself to ben-
efit not only its own but the entire network is an open
challenge.
There are deadlocks that prevent existing game-theoretic
results frommaking practical impacts [18]. The first deadlock
is the low efficiency of Nash equilibrium (NE) where players
aremyopic and harmfully compete with each other [19]–[22].
NE is also often not unique and its performance can be unpre-
dictable. To outperform NE, Stackelberg equilibrium (SE)
arises where there is a foresighted player, referred to as
leader, by knowing full information about the environment
and the strategies of all other myopic users (a.k.a. followers).
Considering the orthogonal frequency-division multiple-
access (OFDMA) model, [23] studied the use of SE for
autonomous spectrum sharing for cognitive radios, revealing
a gain over NE.
Unfortunately, there are operational obstacles in achieving
SE. First of all, to be qualified as a leader, the player should
possess tremendous cognition power, although it could be
learned from the environment by conjectures [24].1 Worse,
a bi-level game is required for reaching SE,2 where there is a
strict order of how the game proceeds to reach the prescribed
equilibrium. For cognitive radio networks, this is either too
restrictive or unrealistic for the very distributed nature of
users in the environment.
The challenges do not end here. There is strong desire to
extend the SE framework to the case where multiple leaders
coexist [24], [25], [35]. DeMiguel and Xu [35] studied the
extension and in their definition of K -SE (K leaders out of
all players), leaders are myopic with respect to (w.r.t.) other
leaders, but only foresighted to followers. To approach the
K -SE, usual challenges in SE remain. Furthermore, accord-
ing to their definition, if all players are leaders, the game
degenerates to an NE, losing the foresightedness advantages
of the leader. In [25], K -SE was employed for optimizing
femtocell communications in which strong assumptions on
leaders such as full channel state information (CSI)3 and
exhaustive optimization, apply. Notably, despite the gain of
SE over NE as reported in [24] and [25], there is still a huge
gap from the centralized optimal solutions [36]–[38] and
the existing methods are far from satisfactory. Meanwhile,
there are emerging applications of game theory for device-
to-device (D2D) communications and heterogenous networks
that addressed related but different network resource opti-
mization problems [26]–[34].
The problem of game theory in this type of applications is
that a rational player by default is selfish and only cares about
its own reward, which depends on not only its own strategy
but also competitors’ responses. Ideally, a player should opti-
mize its strategy, not based on its immediate reward but the
final reward after others’ strategies all settle. This will require
the player to possess cognition power to think beyond the
present time and into the future. However, game theory in its
traditional form does not have the mechanism to permit such
optimization, and reckless competition will lead to undesir-
able equilibria. This may be why game-theoretic approaches
have been largely ineffective in cognitive radios.
To remedy this, in this paper, our novelty is to introduce
each player’s cognition by a belief function which quantifies
how the environment as a whole would respond to any of
1Note that for SE, although conjectural equilibrium (CE) can be used
to make the leader learn the necessary network-wide information, it was
acknowledged in [24] that extending it to K -player SE scenarios is a topic
for future investigation.
2To achieve SE via a bi-level game, the leader will start his action first,
wait for all the followers to play a sub-game to reach an NE, then revise his
action, and the whole process repeats until convergence. A bi-level game is
needed even for CE.
3In this paper, full CSI refers to the CSI knowledge of every transmitter-
receiver link of the entire network, in contrast to local CSI which we refer to
it as the CSI only from a transmitter to its intended receiver.
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its action [39]. By doing so, the players (cognitive radios
in our application) are empowered with forward-looking4
ability and we propose to use a form of Taylor series to
define the players’ reward functions embracing the interactive
nature of the game via their beliefs. The outcome is transfor-
mative, since optimization of the equilibrium resulting from
the players’ strategies becomes possible by different choices
of belief functions. In this paper, we apply this concept to
the cognitive OFDMA radio network where the aim is to
optimize, autonomously, every cognitive radio’s power allo-
cation strategy based on only local CSI for maximizing its
rate. We also consider a hierarchical cognitive radio network
where cognitive radios or SUs compete for the spectrum holes
left out by the PUs but for any busy subcarrier they have
no knowledge whether it is occupied by a PU or another
SU, in the latter case of which the SUs should be allowed
to compete and negotiate the subcarriers among themselves.
In both scenarios, simulation results illustrate promising
results that the proposed belief-directed game [39] gives the
cognition power or brain that cognitive radios need in order
to achieve perfect interference avoidance while maximizing
their achievable rates.
It is worth emphasizing that this paper is not a simple
application of the belief-directed game in [39] to cognitive
radio networks. In particular, we need to choose judiciously
the belief function of the cognitive radios to make it work
before they compete. Choosing an inappropriate belief func-
tion will disable any possible negotiation that could have
happened between the cognitive radios, giving rise to harmful
competition, and a suitable belief function will make all
the difference and allow cognitive radios to naturally nego-
tiate the spectrum resources via a sequence of calculated
forward-looking competitions. To this end, we generalize
the water-filling (WF) optimization of one’s strategy to take
into account of the interactive nature of the OFDMA game,
enabling forward-looking WF (FWF).5,6 Then we study the
equilibrium resulting from the FWF competition of cognitive
radios, and derive key properties that the belief function needs
to satisfy in order to converge to a desirable equilibrium.
In summary, the proposed cognitive approach has the fol-
lowing major advantages:
• First, the proposed method is highly distributed as it
requires each cognitive radio only to know the CSI
from its intended receiver and does not need any global
4There is clear distinction between being forward-looking and fore-
sighted. The former refers to the attempt of taking into account the possi-
ble or likely consequences of a given action, whereas the latter corresponds to
the case of knowing perfectly the final outcome of a given action. Also, being
forward-looking may not imply any accurate prediction of the outcome.
5In [40], an interference price, defined as the negative derivative of a user’s
utility function w.r.t. the total interference power it receives, was introduced
into a resource allocation game for taking into account the interactive nature
of the players. However, the artificial ‘‘prices’’ one has to pay for causing
interference to others and the crosstalk CSI need to be known.
6It is worth noting that in our proposed scheme, the FWF solution takes
into account the likely reaction of other players in one’s strategy optimiza-
tion, and is fundamentally different from the conventional WF and the
modified WF in [41].
knowledge such as the crosstalk CSI, the number of
coexisting cognitive radios, the PUs’ activity and any
historical behavioural data.
• Secondly, it follows from the standard model of free
competition in games. This means that there is no
specific order the competition of the players should
take place, unlike in Stackelberg and conjectural games
which are bi-level, and no synchronization among the
participants is needed. Additionally, being in a game
allows cognitive radios to respond to changes naturally
by revising their actions. Hidden terminal problems may
also be fixed through interaction between the radios.
• More importantly, the proposed approach provides a
new platform for cognitive radios to negotiate the spec-
trum resources over the air by simply competing in a
calculated way via a judicious choice of belief func-
tions. Remarkably, results illustrate that the negotiation-
by-forward-looking-competition works extraordinarily
well, and that in the cognitive OFDMA case, all cog-
nitive radios manage to avoid each other and settle on
their respective good subcarriers free of interference.
On the other hand, in the interweave case where cogni-
tive radios can access any spectrum holes left vacant by
the PUs, our results show that the forward-looking game
empowers the cognitive radios to identify the PUs’ occu-
pied subcarriers and avoid them autonomously without
knowing a-priori which subcarriers are being used by
the PUs, while negotiating with other cognitive radios
by competing with them normally, according to their
carefully chosen beliefs, for the other subcarriers.
• Simulation results reveal that the proposed approach
achieves nearly the sum-rate as the centralized near-
optimal iterative spectrum balancing (ISB) method
in [37] exploiting full global CSl.
• This paper uncovers that tragedy of the commons is not
an inevitable outcome for an interference channel with
competing radios, and can be avoided if the radios are
cognitive with forward-looking ability. Besides, cogni-
tive radios are incentivised to negotiate with each other
in order to get their best rewards, while at the same
time have their actions benefiting the entire network.
Importantly, an ‘‘average’’ cognitive radio in the pro-
posed game outperforms significantly the leader in the
SE, showing that it is much preferred to have all the
competitors forward-looking, than myopic.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the OFDMA network model and the game-
theoretic model for cognitive radios. Section III presents the
forward-looking OFDMA game and the FWF power allo-
cation for the cognitive radios. Then Section IV uses the
forward-looking game as the framework to interpret NE and
SE before developing key results for a desirable equilibrium.
Convergence analysis is also provided. Section V considers
the use of forward-lookimg game for a hierarchical cognitive
OFDMA network. Section VI presents simulation results and
we conclude the paper in Section VII.
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FIGURE 1. A multi-user interference channel model.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Cognitive radio is all about accessing the best channels while
controlling its interference to others to an acceptable level.
In this paper, the dynamic spectrum access problem is viewed
as a resource self-allocation problem, modelled as finding the
self-optimizing strategy for an OFDMA interference channel.
OFDMA is the simplest model to study the problem, with its
result easily extendable to more realistic models.
A. OFDMA INTERFERENCE CHANNELS
Consider a K -user OFDMA interference network, as shown
in Fig. 1, where each user (or any cognitive transmitter-
receiver link) is free to occupy any of the N (≥ K ) orthogonal
frequency subcarriers for communications. The users oper-
ate in a non-cooperative manner and there exists no central
spectrum manager. For user k , the total transmitted power is
constrained by
N∑
n=1
pk [n] ≤ Pk , ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K }, (1)
where pk [n] ≥ 0 denotes the power allocated for the nth
subcarrier by user k and Pk denotes the power budget for
user k . We write pk , {pk [1], pk [2], . . . , pk [N ]} as the power
allocation pattern for user k , which is drawn from some
strategy Pk satisfying (1), or it can be written as pk ∈ Pk .
Let Hij[n] denote the flat-fading channel coefficient from
transmitter i to receiver j which is regarded as static under
which the achievable rate is evaluated, and Nk [n] denote the
noise power density for the complex additive white Gaussian
noise (AWGN) at receiver k on the nth subcarrier. The achiev-
able rate for user k using single-user decoding is therefore
given by
Rk ≡
N∑
n=1
Rk [n] =
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
σk [n]+ Ik [n]
)
(2)
≡
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
ck [n]
)
, (3)
where σk [n] , Nk [n]|Hkk [n]|2 is the normalized noise power on
subcarrier n, Ik [n] =∑Ki=1
i 6=k
pi[n]θik [n] is the total interference
FIGURE 2. The power game subsystem with user k interacting with the
environment.
power on subcarrier n for user k , with θik [n] , |Hik [n]|
2
|Hkk [n]|2
denoting the normalized (by user k) channel power gain from
transmitter (or interference) i to receiver k , and ck [n] ,
σk [n]+Ik [n] corresponds to the overall ‘‘noise’’ on subcarrier
n for user k .
Under this model, users compete on their individual
achievable rates. In particular, a cognitive transmitter may
choose to allocate more power on its own good subcarriers to
boost its rate but will interfere other users more on these sub-
carriers. Channel allocation will be automatically achieved
through power allocation. That is, if pk [n] = 0 for some n,
then the nth subcarrier is not assigned to user k .
B. A GAME-THEORETIC SUBSYSTEM MODEL
Consider the OFDMA interference channel above. Let P ,
{P1,P2, . . . ,PK } denote the set of collection for all users’
power allocation strategies, with pk ∈ Pk ∀k and define
p−k , {p1, . . . ,pk−1,pk+1, . . . ,pK }. (4)
We also let BPk ∈ Pk be user k’s best power allocation
strategy in response to the interference pattern seen by that
user Ik , {Ik [1], Ik [2], . . . , Ik [N ]}. Then mathematically,
BPk is given by
BPk = arg max
pk∈Pk
Rk . (5)
Fig. 2 shows a power game subsystem which depicts how
users interact with each other in a competitive way. Given the
interference seen by user k , it optimizes its power allocation
to give pk = BP(Ik ) which in turn changes the interference
patterns of other users {I`}` 6=k giving rise to their new power
allocation strategies {BP(I`)}` 6=k . The power {BP(I`)} 6`=k
will become the cause of the changes in the interference
pattern seen by user k , Ik . That is,
Ik = Ik
({BP(I`(pk ))}` 6=k). (6)
For convenience, we abuse our notation slightly and define
BP−k (pk ) , {BP(I1), . . . ,BP(Ik−1),BP(Ik+1),
. . . ,BP(IK )}. (7)
The interference pattern for user k , Ik (BP−k (pk )), is recog-
nized to be a function of its own power allocation strategy pk .
Depending on how cognitive transmitters react to change of
the environments and how the power allocation game runs,
if the system converges, it will converge to some equilibrium.
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Throughout, we will use the superscript ∗ to denote the
parameters at the equilibrium so that at the equilibrium,
the power allocation strategy is P∗ = {p∗k ,p∗−k}.
In this setup, users or cognitive radio transmitters are all
uncoordinated individuals, each of which allocates its power
over the subcarriers in order to maximize its own rate based
on its observation of the environment, {ck [n]} for all n (which
is referred to as the local CSI possessed by user k), and
its belief on how the environment would react to its action.
The environment user k observes can change because other
users may alter their strategies to respond to user k’s action.
It is a dynamic process where users all interact and may
compromise to an equilibrium, if their interactions converge
over time.
To model this interaction, from user k’s viewpoint, we can
regard other users as a subsystem (or the environment seen
by user k), as shown in Fig. 2, which takes its action at time t
as inputs (i.e., ptk = {ptk [n]}) and produces a new interference
pattern at time t + 1 as outputs (i.e., ct+1k = {ct+1k [n]}). The
subsystem reacts by an overall response from the actions of
all other users, pt−k , {pt1, . . . ,ptk−1,ptk+1, . . . ,ptK }.
Based on the rate (3), the distributed optimization problem
for the OFDMA channel is
max
pk∈Pk
Rk , ∀k. (8)
The challenge to the above optimization is that Rk is a time-
varying function (via ck ) which changes, according to the
action or reaction of the remaining users. One way of charac-
terizing the interactive process is to use the framework of the
Nash game with forward-looking players [39].
III. A GAME OF FORWARD-LOOKING PLAYERS
A. DEFINITIONS
Players’ cognition is key to defining the resulting equilibrium
of a game. We adopt the framework of the Nash game with
forward-looking players [39]. In particular, a player is said
to be forward-looking if it uses a belief function to quantify
the future reaction of the environment according to its action
at present. Before presenting the formal definition of such
game, the following concepts are important:
• Environmental function—In a competition process,
the reward for player k depends not only on its own strat-
egy xk but also others’ strategies x−k at any given time
instant t . We use the environmental function rk (xt−k ) to
quantify the influence of other players’ strategies onto
player k’s reward.
• Belief function—A player’s understanding on its envi-
ronmental function reflects its cognition about the com-
petition in the game. In a belief-directed game, it is
considered that player k possesses the knowledge of a
belief function, which is denoted as rBk (xk , x
t−k ), where
xt−k denotes the strategies from all the players at time
instant t except player k , and clearly, rBk (x
t
k , x
t−k ) =
rk (xt−k ). The belief function may be constructed using
some form of Taylor series expansion, e.g.,
rBk (xk , x
t−k ) = rk (xt−k )+ ϕtk × (xk − x tk ), (9)
where ϕtk ,
∂rBk (xk ,x
t−k )
∂xk
is regarded as the interference
derivative that predicts the amount of future reaction
from the environment due to present change in strat-
egy. The selection of the interference derivative ϕtk by
the player permits engineering of the equilibrium of
the game. Moreover, the belief function rBk (· · · ) can be
understood as player k’s cognition on what the envi-
ronment function rk (· · · ) would be, given a strategy xk
and the present state xt−k . Note that ϕtk is only a belief
for player k and whether the derivative ∂rk
∂xk
actually
exists or not in the game is irrelevant.
• Predicted reward—The predicted reward function,
fk (xk , rBk (xk , x
t−k )), gives the amount of reward player
k believes to achieve by the strategy, xk , given other
players’ strategies at time t , xt−k , and the belief function
rBk (· · · ) that player k uses to predict the future impact in
the environment.
Based on the above definitions, we now present the NE
with forward-looking players whose cognition is modelled
in the form of some belief functions. Mathematically, this is
written as
fk (x∗k , rBk (x∗k , x∗−k )) ≥ fk (xk , rBk (xk , x∗−k )), ∀k, (10)
where rBk (·) is the belief function reflecting player k’s cog-
nition ability and fk (·) is the predicted reward function for
player k . Note that (10) can be rewritten as
fk (x∗k , x∗−k ) ≥ fk (xk , rBk (xk , x∗−k )), ∀k. (11)
This can be explained by recognizing the fact that according
to (9), rBk (x
∗
k , x
∗−k ) = rk (x∗−k ) and as such at the equilibrium,
we have
fk (x∗k , rBk (x∗k , x∗−k )) = fk (x∗k , rk (x∗−k )) = fk (x∗k , x∗−k ). (12)
In this model, the belief function rBk (·) can be chosen
arbitrarily and it only serves to indicate player k’s understand-
ing about the competition in the environment. In fact, (11)
embraces the conventional NE in which players are myopic
and have the belief function rBk (xk , x
t−k ) = rk (xt−k ) which
effectively treats the environment player k observes at any
present time instant t as fixed and constant and ignores the
subsequent changes in other players’ strategies triggered by
player k’s new strategy.
B. OFDMA WITH FORWARD-LOOKING RADIOS
For the system in Section II, the reward function is the achiev-
able rate Rk in (3) and the strategy for player k (or cognitive
radio transmitter k) is the power allocation strategy pk . Also,
the environmental function is the overall interference result-
ing from other users’ strategies ck (pt−k ).
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Under the belief-directed game, we can form the belief
function to enable player k’s cognition by the Taylor series
cBk [n] , ctk [n]+
∞∑
`=1
ϕ
(`)
k
t
[n](pk [n]− ptk [n])`, (13)
where ϕ(`)k
t
[n] denotes the `th order derivative of the over-
all noise w.r.t. the strategy pk [n] at time t . The deriva-
tives {ϕ(`)k
t
[n]} can be chosen freely to give a different
belief function for the player (which will result in a dif-
ferent game) and hence play the role of the engineering
parameters for the game. Also, we write cBk (pk ,p
t−k ) =
{cBk [1], cBk [2], . . . , cBk [N ]}, which may be viewed as a predic-
tion to ck (p−k ).
Based on the belief function cBk , user k has the predicted
reward function (or predicted rate)
fk (pk , cBk (pk ,p
t−k )) ,
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
cBk [n]
)
, (14)
which is the achievable rate in (3) after replacing ck [n] by
cBk [n]. Note that fk (· · · ) provides a predictive rate given the
strategy pk and the present state pt−k at time instant t .
Mathematically, at the NE with forward-looking players,
we have
fk (p∗k , cBk (p∗k ,p∗−k )) ≥ fk (pk , cBk (pk ,p∗−k )),
∀pk ∈ Pk and ∀k. (15)
NE is a special case of the equilibrium of the belief-directed
game and this can be seen when ϕ(`)∗k [n] = 0 ∀` ≥ 1 and∀n, k . In this case, we have cBk = ctk and (15) is therefore
degenerated to
fk (p∗k , ck (p∗−k )) ≥ fk (pk , ck (p∗−k )), ∀pk ∈ Pk and ∀k.
(16)
The above states that at the equilibrium, the rewards for all
cognitive radios are maximized, giving no incentive for them
to deviate from it, and they all settle on their strategies {p∗k}.
Note that the predicted rate does not need to be accurate for
the game to work, though the general sense is that an accurate
prediction should help users find better strategies. Also, NE
is a result from an unrealistic prediction, which is based on
the assumption of a static environment.
C. FWF
For the conventional NE, each user attempts to maximize
its rate as if the interference ck is fixed regardless of its
applied strategy. However, this is flaw and due to the inter-
active nature of the environment, ck will depend on user k’s
strategy. Ignoring this fact will mean that users do not inten-
tionally control their interference to others while attempting
to enhance their rates [19]. In this paper and in contrast
to previous work, the interactiveness of the game is taken
into account, and the users become forward-looking. For the
power allocation of the OFDMA type problem, the solution
usually has an interpretation of WF over the subcarriers and
this is no different even if the users are forward-looking.
In the OFDMA belief-directed game, at time t , user k aims
to find the strategy for time t + 1 by
pt+1k = arg maxpk∈Pk fk (pk , c
B
k (pk ,p
t−k )). (17)
In order to make (17) solvable, it is advisable to choose
{ϕ(`)k
t
[n]} such that
cBk [n] > 0, (18a)
∂fk (pk , cBk )
∂pk [n]
> 0, (18b)
∂2fk (pk , cBk )
∂(pk [n])2
< 0, (18c)
so that (17) is a convex optimization problem. Note that (13)
is a very general form to describe the belief function, and
how to utilize it to design the most efficient OFDMA belief-
directed game is unknown. In this paper, for mathematical
tractability, we propose to choose {ϕ(1)k
t
[n]} appropriately to
optimize the OFDMA resource allocation game while setting
ϕ
(`)
k
t
[n] = 0 for ` ≥ 3 and ∀t, n. Also,
ϕ
(2)
k
t
[n] > −c
t
k [n]+ ϕtk [n](pk [n]− ptk [n])
(pk [n]− ptk [n])2
(19)
can be chosen to ensure that cBk [n] > 0 is satisfied, where
ϕtk [n] = ϕ(1)k
t
[n] for notational brevity.
Based on the definition (15), at time instant t , forward-
looking user k aims to solve
pt+1k = arg maxpk∈Pk
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
cBk (pk ,p
t−k )[n]
)
. (20)
Theorem 1: The optimal strategy update for user k in (20)
is given by
pt+1k [n] =
(
wtkx
t
k [n]− (x tk [n])2
wtky
t
k [n]+ x tk [n]
)+
, (21)
where (a)+ = max{0, a}, x tk [n] , cBk (pt+1k ,pt−k )[n], ytk [n] ,
∂cBk [n]
∂pk [n]
∣∣∣∣
pk [n]=pt+1k [n]
and wtk (> 0) is regarded as the water-level
that ensures the equality of the power constraint (1) for the
maximization.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
The power allocation (21) is based on the maximization of
a forward-looking or predicted rate (via the belief function
cBk ) and therefore dubbed FWF solution. Note that its WF
interpretation follows exactly the same way as the conven-
tional WF with a water-level wtk . As t → ∞, if all users’
strategies converge to a stable state, then from (13), we have
x∗k [n] = cB∗k [n]
∣∣∣
pk [n]=p∗k [n]
= c∗k [n],
y∗k [n] =
∂cB∗k [n]
∂pk [n]
∣∣∣∣∣
pk [n]=p∗k [n]
= ϕ∗k [n],
(22)
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and as a consequence, at the equilibrium, we obtain the users’
strategies
p∗k [n] =
(
w∗kc∗k [n]− (c∗k [n])2
w∗kϕ∗k [n]+ c∗k [n]
)+
, ∀k, n. (23)
The intuition is that although there can be many parame-
ters {ϕ(m)k
t
[n]}∀m,n that can be adjusted in a player’s belief,
the power allocation strategy at the equilibrium depends
only on ϕ∗k [n] (the first derivative but not the higher-order
ones), or the choice of {ϕ(m)k
t
[n]}∀m≥2 plays no role in defin-
ing the equilibrium. This justifies setting the higher-order
derivatives in the belief function to zeros earlier.
A common structure in the OFDMA resource allocation
game, regardless of the chosen belief functions and the result-
ing equilibrium, is to solve (5), which can be tackled by the
Lagrangian multiplier method. In particular, this is done by
defining
L =
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
σk [n]+ Ik [n]
)
− λ
(
N∑
n=1
pk [n]− Pk
)
,
(24)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier, and finding pk that
maximizes L. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions
for optimality can be derived as
∂L
∂pk [n]
{
= 0 for pk [n] > 0,
≤ 0 for pk [n] = 0. (25)
Moreover, with (26), as shown at the top of the next page, and
knowing ϕk [n] , ∂ck [n]∂pk [n] = ∂Ik [n]∂pk [n] , it can be simplified as
∂L
∂pk [n]
= 1
c2k [n]+ϕk [n]p2k [n]
ck [n]−ϕk [n]pk [n]+pk [n]
− λ ≡ 1
ηk [n]+pk [n] − λ.
(27)
As a consequence, the optimal power allocation (or best
resource allocation response) for user k has the well-known
WF interpretation and is given by
pk [n] = (wk − ηk [n])+, (28)
where
wk = (σk [n]+ Ik [n])
2 + ϕk [n]p2k [n]
σk [n]+ Ik [n]− ϕk [n]pk [n] + pk [n], (29)
is the ‘‘water-level’’ set to satisfy the power constraint∑
n pk [n] ≤ Pk . Although this version of WF solution may
look complicated (as both wk and ηk [n] are functions of
pk [n]), this is much more general and facilitates the design of
algorithms converging to different equilibria by obtaining an
appropriate (belief) function ϕk [n] to model various level of
cognition ability of the cognitive radio user. The introduction
of the interference derivative ϕk [n] is significant because this
provides the parameter that, if properly chosen, can guide the
negotiation process between the users to reach a desirable
equilibrium. This is the form we use to carry out the FWF
allocation if the interference derivative ϕk [n] is known.
For NE as an example, ϕk [n] = 0 is considered (because
the user believes that cBk [n] is fixed and does not depend on the
strategy pk [n] or ϕk [n] = ∂c
B
k [n]
pk [n]
= 0) and (28) can therefore
be greatly simplified as
pk [n] = (wk − σk [n]− Ik [n])+. (30)
IV. EQUILIBRIUM VERSUS BELIEF
A. NE
At NE, p∗k = BP(I∗k ) and p∗−k = BP−k (p∗k ), so the strategy
profile is written as P∗ = {BP(I∗k ),BP−k (p∗k )}. Additionally,
NE can be formulated formally as
Rk (p∗k ,BP−k (p∗k )) ≥ Rk (pk ,BP−k (p∗k )),
∀pk ∈ Pk and ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K }.
(31)
User k’s data rate, R∗k , is therefore given by
R∗k = maxpk∈Pk
∑
n
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
σk [n]+ I∗k [n]
)
(32)
= max
pk∈Pk
∑
n
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
σk [n]+ Ik (BP−k (p∗k ))[n]
)
. (33)
Note that the above maximization is done under a fixed
interference pattern I∗k . As mentioned before, achieving NE
will have ϕk [n] = ∂I
∗
k [n]
∂pk [n]
= 0 and
p∗k = BP(Ik (BP−k (p∗k ))) ∀k. (34)
This can be achieved by the iterative (multiuser) WF algo-
rithm as follows:
ptk + σk + Ik (BP−k (pt−1k )) = wtk , (35a)
pt+1k + σk + Ik (BP−k (ptk )) = wt+1k , (35b)
...
p∗k + σk + Ik (BP−k (p∗k )) = w∗k . (35c)
In the above, the subcarrier index [n] has been omitted for
convenience. The iterations (35) follow largely from the
single-user WF solution in (30) but the only difference is that
the interference pattern seen by user k changes due to a new
response from other users before reaching to the steady state.
Every user in the equilibrium is deemed self-optimal giv-
ing the highest rate, w.r.t. other users’ steady-state power
allocation. Thus, a user does not gain by deviating from the
equilibrium. However, NE can be overly competitive leading
to a very suboptimal power game equilibrium.
B. SE
It is possible to reach a different equilibrium that to some user
allows better reconciliation between users to outperform NE.
One such equilibrium is SE [23] where one user is regarded as
the Stackelberg leader, say user κ , who can maximize its own
rate, Rκ , by finding its optimal strategy knowing that other
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∂L
∂pk [n]
= 1
σk [n]+ Ik [n]+ pk [n]
(
σk [n]+ Ik [n]− pk [n] ∂Ik [n]∂pk [n]
σk [n]+ Ik [n]
)
− λ (26)
users (regarded as followers) are myopic and will respond by
their (Nash-like) best power allocation.
Mathematically, we have
Rκ (p∗κ ,BP−κ (p∗κ ))
≥ Rκ (pκ ,BP−κ (pκ )), ∀pκ ∈ Pκ ,
Rk (p∗k ,BP−k (p∗k ))
≥ Rk (pk ,BP−k (p∗k )), ∀pk ∈ Pk and k 6= κ.
(36)
As a result, user κ’s data rate, R∗κ , can be formulated as
R∗κ =
∑
n
log2
(
1+ p
∗
κ [n]
σκ [n]+ I∗κ [n]
)
(37)
= max
pκ∈Pκ
∑
n
log2
(
1+ BP(Iκ (BP−κ (pκ )))[n]
σκ [n]+ Iκ (BP−κ (pκ ))[n]
)
. (38)
In the literature, when solving (38), a brute-force optimiza-
tion is usually needed, which is not only prohibitively com-
plex but also that no knownmethod exists to play the leader to
reach SE. Using the belief-directed game as a tool, however,
one could choose ϕtκ [n] appropriately to achieve that. Note
that ϕtκ [n] is, by no means, the actual interference derivative
of the game (which is usually impossible to know) but, when
chosen, it carries the operational meaning to force the game
to behave a certain way. In this paper, our interpretation is that
through ϕtκ [n], users compete in a calculated fashion.
Theorem 2: At the equilibrium of SE, the leader, user κ ,
satisfies
− c
∗
κ [n]
2c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
≤ ϕ∗κ [n] ≤
c∗κ [n]
p∗κ [n]
. (39)
Proof: See Appendix B. 
The following theorem studies the uniqueness of SE in the
belief-directed game.
Theorem 3: If ϕtκ [n] exists and it satisfies (39) for all time
t > 0, then SE is unique and user κ achieves the maximum
achievable rate given that all other users are myopic.
Proof: See Appendix C. 
The result of Theorem 2 suggests that the belief for the
leader κ in the form of interference derivative be chosen to
satisfy (39). Note that there are likely many choices of ϕtκ [n]
that can all permit the users to converge to SE. Nevertheless,
we choose
ϕtκ [n] = −
ctκ [n]
2ctκ [n]+ ptκ [n]
∀n. (40)
There are a few observations we can make to understand
why this choice is good. First of all, to have a judicious
belief on ϕtκ [n], the interference derivative should be neg-
ative, or ϕtκ [n] ≤ 0 because it then has a strong ten-
dency to invest power on a good subcarrier. On the contrary,
if ϕtκ [n] > 0, this will imply that the more the power it
allocates for a subcarrier the more the interference it gets,
thus ending up occupying a poor subcarrier at the equilibrium.
On the other hand, it has been shown in Theorem 3 that
as long as ϕ∗κ [n] exists and (39) is true, the equilibrium is
unique and therefore, any value in this interval could be a sen-
sible choice for the interference derivative ϕtκ [n]. However,
it should also be noted that the magnitude of ϕtκ [n] reflects
the forward-looking capability, or if ϕtκ [n] = 0, the user is
myopic and not forward-looking. As a result, (40) is expected
to be a proper choice formaximizing user κ’s rate. In addition,
setting (40) in the FWF solution of the leading user κ for all
time t > 0 will force the game to behave as if the actual
interference derivative of the game satisfies (39) even though
it may actually be different.
Specifically, to reach the leader-followers SE, the leader
(i.e., user κ) can therefore play the FWF power allocation (28)
with appropriately chosen {ϕκ [n]} given by (40) while the
followers (i.e., the remaining users) respond by the traditional
WF (30) with ϕk [n] = 0. As such, the following iterative
FWF algorithm can be used to let the users compete to
converge to the SE:
Leader κ

ptκ + ηtκ (pt−1κ ) = wtκ
pt+1κ + ηtκ (ptκ ) = wt+1κ
...
p∗κ + η∗κ = w∗κ
(41)
and for all followers k 6= κ , we have
ptk + σk + Ik (BP−k (pt−1k )) = wtk ,
pt+1k + σk + Ik (BP−k (ptk )) = wt+1k ,
...
p∗k + σk + Ik (BP−k (p∗k )) = w∗k .
(42)
Note that ηtκ [n] ,
(ctκ [n])
2+ϕtκ [n](ptκ [n])2
ctκ [n]−ϕtκ [n]ptκ [n] (which was defined in
(27) earlier) using (40).
C. EQUILIBRIUM FROM ALL FORWARD-LOOKING RADIOS
We have now shown that both NE and SE can be achieved
autonomously using belief-directed games as each individual
user simply needs to perform its FWF power allocation and
their simultaneous interactions, once converged, will lead to
the results. Therefore, spectrum sharing is done in a self-
organising and autonomous way. However, so far, only the
Stackelberg leader is forward-looking, while the Nash users
are all myopic. In order to let all users become forward-
looking, all {ϕk [n]} need to be set non-zero.
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Mathematically, the equilibrium for an all forward-looking
cognitive radio game can be written as
Rk (p∗k ,BP−k (p∗k )) ≥ Rk (pk ,BP−k (pk )),
∀pk ∈ Pk and k = 1, 2, . . . ,K . (43)
We refer to this equilibrium as forward-looking equilibrium
(FE). It is possible to derive similar results like (40) in SE for
FE. We present such results in the following theorems.
Theorem 4: The interference derivatives for FE, {ϕ∗k [n]},
satisfy
ϕ∗k [n] =
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik [n]
ϕ∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗k [n]
. (44)
Proof: First, by definition, we have
ϕ∗k [n] =
∂I∗k [n]
∂p∗k [n]
=
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik [n]
∂p∗i [n]
∂p∗k [n]
(45)
=
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik [n]
∂p∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗k [n]
, (46)
where
∂p∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
=
(
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗i [n]
)−1 = (ϕ∗i [n])−1, which directly
yields (44) and completes the proof. 
In the above proof, the physical meaning to have
∂p∗i [n]
∂I∗i [n]
=(
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗i [n]
)−1 = (ϕ∗i [n])−1 is that since users are all forward
looking, their strategies are to reverse any changes deviating
from the equilibrium to maintain the equilibrium (the most
beneficial outcome). Theorem 4 provides a key property to
facilitate exchange of network-wide information between the
forward-looking cognitive radios through competition.
Before we derive the belief, i.e., ϕtk [n], to approach FE,
the following proposition is useful.
Proposition 1: To achieve FE, we propose to construct a
game to satisfy the physical property:
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])sgn(p∗k [n])θik [n]θki[n] ≤
c∗k [n]
2c∗k [n]+ p∗k [n]
.
(47)
Proof: See Appendix D. 
Proposition 2: To achieve FE, the interference derivative
can be made to satisfy
ϕ∗k [n] ≥ −
√
c∗k [n]
2c∗k [n]+ p∗k [n]
∀k, n. (48)
Proof: See Appendix F. 
It is worth noting that (48) is a weaker property for FE,
a result deduced from the original property (44). Satisfying
(48) does not necessarily imply (44). Nonetheless, it does
bring the possibility of network-wide forward-looking-ness
by competition between cognitive radios based on local chan-
nel observation and will therefore make self-optimization
realizable by the following proposition.
Proposition 3: A self-optimizing OFDMA cognitive radio
network approaching to FE can be constructed by FWF such
that the power allocation for user k at time t is updated by
ptk [n] =
wtk −
(
ctk [n]
)2 + ϕtk [n] (pt−1k [n])2
ctk [n]− ϕtk [n]pt−1k [n]

+
,
where ϕtk [n] = −
√
ctk [n]
2ctk [n]+ pt−1k [n]
∀k. (49)
The above self-optimization follows the same rationale
behind that for achieving SE described before. In particular,
the operational interference derivative for carrying out FWF
is chosen to satisfy the environmental interference deriva-
tive property of FE (48). Again, being a self-optimization,
the equilibrium can be achieved by simultaneous FWF in any
order. The following theorem studies its uniqueness.
Theorem 5: If ϕtk [n] > − c
t
k [n]
4ctk [n]+ptk [n] ∀k, n such that
ptk [n] > 0 and this is true for all time t > 0, then the game
has a unique FE and the FWF in (49) achieves the unique
equilibrium and is also rate-optimal.
Proof: See Appendix G. 
D. CONVERGENCE ANALYSIS
The cognitive power-interference OFDMA game can be gen-
erally analyzed by recognizing that
1ptk [n] = ρtk [n]1I tk [n], for some ρtk [n] ≤ 0
(FWF reoptimization—observe and act),
1I t+1k [n] = ϕtk [n]1ptk [n], for some ϕtk [n] ≤ 0
(environmental response—act and react),
(50)
where ρk [n] , ∂pk [n]∂Ik [n] is defined as the derivative for the power
allocation w.r.t. the interference pattern.
In what follows, we can write
1I t+1k [n] = ϕtk [n]1ptk [n] =
∑
i 6=k
1pti [n]θik [n], (51)
1pt+1k [n] = ρt+1k [n]1I t+1k [n]
= ρt+1k [n]ϕtk [n]1ptk [n]
= ρt+1k [n]
∑
i 6=k
1pti [n]θik [n]. (52)
Convergence may take place in two possible cases: (i)
|1pt+1k [n]| < |1ptk [n]| for all t ≥ t0 for some t0 >
0, and (ii) |1pt+1k [n]| > |1ptk [n]| for all t ≥ t0 for
some t0 > 0, the latter of which belongs to the case
of a strong interference channel. To proceed, we define
|1pt [n]| , maxk |1ptk [n]|, |1pt [n]| , mink |1ptk [n]|,
|ρt [n]| , maxk |ρtk [n]|, |ρt [n]| , mink |ρtk [n]|, |θ [n]| ,
maxi 6=j |θij[n]| and |θ [n]| , mini6=j |θij[n]|. Our objective here
is to show that it is possible to obtain sufficient conditions for
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FIGURE 3. The sufficient convergence regions according to Lemma 1.
convergence in terms of the channel parameters |θ [n]| and
|θ [n]|. To see this, we first consider (i) by
|1pt+1[n]| (a)= max
k
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρt+1k [n]
∑
i 6=k
1pti [n]θik [n]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (53)
≤ |ρt+1[n]||1pt [n]|θ [n](K − 1), (54)
where (a) is due to (52). Therefore, a sufficient condition for
convergence is to have
|ρt+1[n]|θ [n](K − 1) < 1⇒ θ [n] < 1
(K − 1)|ρt+1[n]|
(55)
because this will guarantee |1pt+1[n]| < |1pt [n]| ∀k , lead-
ing to 1p∞k [n] = 0 ∀k .
On the other hand, for (ii) |1pt+1k [n]| > |1ptk [n]|, this
will converge as well since |1ptk [n]| is finite due to the total
power constraint, Pk . This can be interpreted as the scenario
where a user, say k , decides to allocate all its power to given
subcarriers (if 1ptk [n] > 0) or to withdraw all its power (if
1ptk [n] < 0). The former illustrates the case that user k wants
to take over the subcarriers and others will have a strong
tendency to leave the subcarriers due to severe interference
caused by user k . The consequence is that those subcarriers
will be occupied by user k only, and hence, ϕtk [n] = 0,
resulting the strong interference channel studied in [42], [43].
To obtain a sufficient condition for such convergence, we con-
sider
|1pt+1k [n]| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣ρt+1k [n]
∑
i 6=k
1pti [n]θik [n]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ |ρt+1[n]||1pt [n]|θ [n] ∀k, (56)
where we used the fact that {1pti [n]}∀i are all of the same
sign (all positive or all negative). As such, it will converge to
a strong interference channel if
|ρt+1[n]|θ [n] > 1⇒ θ [n] > 1|ρt+1[n]| . (57)
Fig. 3 illustrates the convergence regions based on the two
sufficient conditions above.
The convergence behaviors for various equilibria can thus
be analyzed via ρtk [n] (for p
t
k [n] > 0):
ρtk [n] =
1ptk [n]
1I tk [n]
= 1(w
t
k − ηtk [n])+
1I tk [n]
= −1η
t
k [n]
1I tk [n]
= −1η
t
k [n]
1ctk [n]
. (58)
As a result, we have the following lemma for evaluating ρtk [n]
of NE, SE and FE.
Lemma 1: Based on (58), we have (59) (see next page).
Proof: See Appendix H. 
For NE, |ρtk [n]| = 1 and a sufficient convergence condition
is θ [n] < 1K−1 , as reported in [20], [44]–[46]. Also, our
analysis shows that θ [n] > 1 will ensure convergence and
in this case a given subcarrier will be occupied by one user
only, which aligns with the result for the strong interference
channel in [42], [43]. Since |ρtk [n]| = 2 for SE, it has a
similar, but slightly better, convergence behavior than NE.
For FE, as opposed to NE and SE, |ρtk [n]| can take very
different values depending on
pt−1k [n]
ctk [n]
. If
pt−1k [n]
ctk [n]
is large, then
|ρtk [n]| will be very large and thus convergence will tend
to occur on the second region θ [n] & 0, in which case
according to our analysis users at the equilibrium will be
made orthogonal.
V. FE FOR HIERARCHICAL COGNITIVE OFDMA
Here, we apply the FE approach (realized by FWF in (49))
for autonomous resource allocation of a group of SUs who
opportunistically access the spectrum holes left vacant by the
PUs of the spectrum.
A. MODEL AND THE COGNITIVE FE GAME
Our model assumes an N -subcarrier OFDMA system serving
M PUs in the presence of K SUs (each with a total power
constraint Pk ). The SUs have no prior knowledge of which
subcarriers are used by the PUs and which by any other SUs.
Let qm[n] and pk [n] denote, respectively, the power allocated
by the mth PU and that by the kth SU on the nth subcarrier.
Also, we denote the channel between PU m and SU k on
subcarrier n as H˜mk [n], while the channel between SU k and
SU j is denoted by Hkj[n]. With Nk [n] being the noise power
at SU k on subcarrier n, the achievable rate for SU k is
RSUk =
N∑
n=1
log2
(
1+ pk [n]
σk [n]+ Ik [n]+ I˜k [n]
)
(60)
where σk [n] and Ik [n] are defined as before, and I˜k [n] ,∑M
m=1 qm[n]θ˜mk [n] denotes the interference caused by the
PUs on subcarrier n seen by SU k with θ˜mk [n] , |H˜mk [n]|
2
|Hkk [n]|2 .
Also, we define the overall noise as
ck [n] , σk [n]+ Ik [n]+ I˜k [n]. (61)
Similarly, we also have the total interference on subcarrier n
seen by PU m caused by SUs as ˜˜Im[n] = ∑Kk=1 pk [n]θ˜km[n].
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|ρtk [n]| =
∣∣∣∣1ηtk [n]1ctk [n]
∣∣∣∣ =

1 if ϕtk [n] = 0 (NE),
2 if ϕtk [n] = − c
t
k [n]
2ctk [n]+pt−1k [n]
(SE with user k as leader),
1
2
√
pt−1k [n]
ctk [n]
if ϕtk [n] = −
√
ctk [n]
2ctk [n]+pt−1k [n]
when
pt−1k [n]
ctk [n]
is large (FE),
(59)
Ideally, for those n ∈ Q , {n|qm[n] > 0}, i.e., the subcarriers
used by PUs, the SUs should have pk [n] = 0. We assume
that the number of subcarriers unused by the PUs is greater
than K .
FE is a realization that all users adapt their strategies
knowing how others respond based on the belief established
from the property (49). Therefore, the equilibrium for the
optimization of SUs is given as
RSUk (p
∗
k ,BP−k (p∗k )) ≥ RSUk (pk ,BP−k (pk )),
∀pk ∈Pk and k=1, 2, . . . ,K , (62)
which means that any SU will not gain (in rate) by deviating
from the FE based on the belief.
Proposition 3 is used for the SUs to carry out FWF simul-
taneously to approach the equilibrium.
B. WATER-LEVEL ANALYSIS AS PROTECTION
INDICATOR FOR PUS
The water-level at the steady-state is the only parameter that
decides if an SU stays or leaves any given subcarriers. Here,
we analyze the water-level of the cognitive FE game.
Corollary 1: If ck [n] ≥ w∗k , then pk [n] = 0, meaning that
subcarrier n will not be taken by SU k .
Proof: See Appendix I. 
For each subcarrier, in FWF, ηk [n] is compared with the
water-level and if it is smaller than the water-level, the sub-
carrier will be taken by SU k; otherwise, it will be left out.
It is worth pointing out that ηk [n] has the meaning of being
a ‘‘strategic’’ or ‘‘interactive’’ noise because it couples the
overall channel noise with the responses from the environ-
ment (i.e., ϕk [n]) due to the power allocation by that user.
For the best interest of the PUs, the water-level for SU k , w∗k ,
should be kept as low as possible. Ideally, if the water-level
is the noise floor, then SU k will only use spectrum holes.
In Section V-D, it is found that users in the OFDMA
FE game will be made orthogonal or converge to a strong
interference channel [42], [43] if the given channel satisfies,
see (57) and Lemma 1,
min
j,k,n
j 6=k
θjk [n] >
(
min
k,n
∣∣∣∣∂ηk [n]∂ck [n]
∣∣∣∣)−1 ≈ 2
mink,n
√
pk [n]
ck [n]
. (63)
As explained before, it is of interest to consider the case that
every subcarrier chosen by a SU has a good quality channel
for that SU, i.e., with high SNR. If this is the case, then the
right-hand-side of (63) will be a very small number, and as
such, for a given channel realization {θjk [n]}, (63) will likely
be met, leading FE to allocate orthogonal subcarriers to the
SUs (hence, Ik [n] = 0 for those chosen subcarriers). This
makes sense and is indeed possible in our setting because the
number of subcarriers available for the SUs is greater than
the number of competing SUs. It is also anticipated that for
maximizing the SU rates, as required by FE, users should be
harmonized, resulting in an interference-free channel.
Proposition 4: At the steady-state of FE, the water-level
for SU k can be approximated by
w∗k ≈
√
ck [n]pk [n] for some n s.t.
pk [n]
ck [n]
 1. (64)
Proof: See Appendix J. 
Proposition 5: The water-level of FE can be estimated as
w∗k ≈ N0
√
P0
N0
K
N˜
≤ N0
√
P0
N0
, (65)
where Nk [n] = N0,∀k, n, Pk = P0,∀k and N˜ denotes
the number of subcarriers leftover by the PUs. The water-
level is independent of k as users are assumed statistically
independent and identical.
Proof: See Appendix K. 
Note that the water-level of FE for the SUs is a scaled
version of the noise floor, see (65).
Proposition 6: SU k at FE will avoid the PUs completely
if
min
n∈Q
I˜k [n]
N0
>
√
P0
N0
K
N˜
− 1. (66)
Proof: See Appendix L. 
This states that if the PUs are causing substantial interfer-
ence, I˜k [n′], to the SUs, then the SUswill tend to prevent those
subcarriers because the PUs do not play the FE game and
those interference cannot be mitigated by the SU strategies.
As a matter of fact, the SUs have a very good sensitivity
in protecting the PUs. For instance, with the average per-
subcarrier SNR for an SU, P0N0
K
N˜
= 100, as long as the
PU-to-SU interference to noise ratio, I˜k [n
′]
N0
> 9 (i.e., >
9.5dB), it will be sufficient to protect the PUs. This can be
easily achieved if the PUs transmit high power for their active
subcarriers. Intriguingly, it is also possible to impose an upper
limit on P0N0 (a channel-independent average SNR) for the SUs
so that a higher protection (making (66) easier to meet) for the
PUs can be achieved.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we provide simulation results to evaluate
the self-optimizing FWF algorithm for cognitive radios. The
iterative spectrum balancing (ISB) method in [37], which is
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TABLE 1. Number of times for divergence in 1000 independent
simulations.
TABLE 2. Average number of iterations for convergence where
convergence is said to achieve if the change in strategy for every
subcarrier is smaller than 10−3, with x = 0.4, Pk = 100, Nk [n] = 0.01 and
N
K = 3.
TABLE 3. Average users’ sum-rates for the 3-user 9-subcarrier
interference channel.
FIGURE 4. The cumulative density functions for the rate-ratios. Results
for only two users are shown.
a near-optimal centralized algorithm requiring full network
CSI, is used as a performance upper bound, if provided. In the
simulations, we model each subcarrier by an equal-power
four-ray frequency selective Rayleigh fading channel [47]
|Hij[n]|2 = |h(1)ij [n]|2 + |h(2)ij [n]|2 + |h(3)ij [n]|2 + |h(4)ij [n]|2
(67)
and it is assumed that E[
∣∣Hij[n]∣∣2] = x and E[|h(l)ij [n]|2] =
0.25x ∀l, for i 6= j. For i = j, we set E[|Hkk [n]|2] = 1 and
E[|h(l)kk [n]|2] = 0.25 ∀`. Hence, to help with the discussion,
we use the parameter x to measure the relative severity of the
interference channel. If x is larger, the interference is more
and vice versa.
A. CONVERGENCE
Table 1 provides the likelihood results of convergence
for different FWF intending for different equilibria with
FIGURE 5. The average sum-rate comparison against the SNR.
FIGURE 6. The average system sum-rate comparison for various x .
FIGURE 7. The water-level at FE against the SU SNR.
Pk = 100 ∀k and Nk [n] = 0.01 ∀k, n. As shown, there is
a small percentage of cases where NE and SE diverge and as
the number of users increases, this will become more prob-
lematic. In contrast, FE always converges except when x is
small meaning that the channel has only very weak crosstalk.
This is because for small x, noise becomes the dominant
effect which does not react to the players’ actions but users
in FE tend to interpret the overall noise as interference due to
other users. As such, there will be a small percentage of times
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FIGURE 8. Rate allocation comparison for NE and FE. (a) NE. (b) FE.
(less than 5%) for FE to diverge. In terms of convergence
speed, nevertheless, FE generally would take longer to con-
verge than NE and SE, see the results in Table 2.
B. RATE PERFORMANCE
In Table 3, results are provided for the average users’ sum-
rates for a 3-user 9-subcarrier interference channel, with
Pk = 100 ∀k , Nk [n] = 0.01 ∀k, n and x = 0.4. Results
show that there is a considerable gain in the sum-rates using
FE over NE and SE. The cumulative density functions for the
sum-rate ratios between FE andNE users and between SE and
NE users are given in Fig. 4. We see that for FE it is possible
to have the sum-rate 5 times greater than what is achieved by
NE. Furthermore, we compare the rate performance between
FE and ISB [37] in Fig. 5 for x = 0.5 and various SNR which
is defined as P0NN0 where Pk = P0 ∀k , Nk [n] = N0 ∀k, n.
Results show that FE achieves nearly the same average sum-
rate as ISB and significantly outperforms SE and NE in terms
of rates for the entire range of SNR.
To provide a more complete comparison between NE, SE,
FE and ISB, in Fig. 6, we provide the average system sum-rate
results for various x (various severity of interference between
the users). A 3-user 9-subcarrier channel with Pk = 100 ∀k ,
Nk [n] = 0.01 ∀k, n and x from 0.001 to 10 is considered.
We discuss the results by inspecting three separate regions:
(1) x ≤ 0.06, (2) 0.06 < x ≤ 4 and (3) x > 4. In Region (1),
x is so small that the channel is reduced to K parallel single-
user OFDMA channels. In this case, users do not interfere
with each other and NE, SE and FE all achieve sum-rate
performance close to the centralized ISB, with FE being
slightly inferior than NE and SE. Basically, all the game-
theoretic approaches operate under an assumption that the
players’ strategies affect the interference patterns the users
see but for small x, this is no longer true or at least not
necessary. For this reason, since FE users are using an overly
aggressive strategy in playing, they are slightly inferior than
NE and SE users.
FIGURE 9. The average sum-rate results comparison: (a) Rate against the
SNR per SU in dB with x = 0.4 and (b) rate against the crosslink severity x
with the SNR per SU being 24 dB.
Region (2) covers themost typical scenarios of interference
channels. In this region, the performance differences between
ISB and game-theoretic equilibria become much more sig-
nificant. In particular, the average sum-rates of NE and SE
are considerably compromised, while FE is able to achieve
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the sum-rate close to that of ISB. Finally, in Region (3), NE,
SE and FE all appear to converge to the same performance
which is also very close to that for ISB. This is because when
x is very large (i.e., the interference links are much stronger
than the desired links), this forces to completely avoid sharing
any subcarriers, even for NE and SE [42], [43]. Consequently,
they all perform equally and as well as ISB.
C. PU-SU COEXISTENCE
Next, we evaluate the performance of the proposed FE game
for cognitive OFDMA in the presence of PUs. In the simula-
tions, we considered 14 subcarriers (i.e., N = 14) and four
randomly chosen subcarriers were occupied by a PU with
a fixed transmit power q[n] = 5 on each such subcarrier.
Two SUs (K = 2) were seeking to access the subcarriers.
They do not have prior knowledge on who is occupying a
particular subcarrier, but should ideally compete only with
each other but not the PU. For convenience, we assumed that
Pk = P0 ∀k Nk [n] = N0 ∀k, n and as before modeled each
crosstalk link by an equal-power four-ray Rayleigh channel
with E[|Hjk [n]|2] = E[|H˜mk [n]|2] = x, for j 6= k . The SNR
for an SU is defined as P0NN0 .
Fig. 7 shows the numerical values of many independent
runs of FE for various SNR assuming x = 0.4 andN0 = 0.01.
Results illustrate that our estimate for the water-level by (65)
is accurate for the entire range of the SU SNR. On the other
hand, results in Fig. 8 provide an example of rate allocation
for an arbitrary channel realization, which shows that the
SUs in FE manage to avoid the subcarriers used by the
PU and each other automatically, whereas the SUs in NE
mostly collide with each other and jam the PU. Fig. 9 further
compares the FE and NE as the SU strategies in terms of the
average sum-rates for both the PU and the SUs. As we can
see, FE can achieve a much higher sum-rate for the SUs than
NE, while at the same time having a much stronger protection
for the PU. In particular, the PU sum-rate is unaffected by the
SUs in FE but can be severely penalized by the SUs in NE for
high SNRs.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper introduced brain power to cognitive radios by way
of some belief on the interference derivative of the resource
allocation game, which in turn allows them to project their
achievable rates after competition w.r.t. their actions before
they actually compete. This new formulation has led to WF
power allocation at the cognitive radio that is forward look-
ing, hence referred to as FWF. Based on this formulation,
we studied the properties of the interference derivative for
the rate-maximizing equilibrium and proposed to tune the
belief of cognitive radios based on these properties. Our
interpretation for the FWF power allocation using the cho-
sen belief is that with the forward-looking ability, cognitive
radios can gain network-wide information to negotiate the
spectrum resources among themselves by a sequence of cal-
culated competitions, thereby converging to a much more
efficient equilibrium. Simulation results have illustrated some
promises of this approach and in particular, an autonomous
OFDMA using the proposed FE approach, with each cog-
nitive radio possessing only local CSI, can achieve nearly
the same network sum-rate as that for the centralized ISB
solution requiring full network CSI. We have also applied
this method to the hierarchical cognitive radio network where
SUs compete among themselves for the spectrum holes left
vacant by the PUs. Results also have revealed that forward-
looking SUs can settle on their good subcarriers to maximize
their rates while completely avoiding each other and the PUs,
even not knowing which subcarriers are occupied by the PUs
at the beginning. As a side product, we have also shown that
we can interpret NE and SE using the FE framework with
different choices of belief on the interference derivative. This
may provide routes to discover new understanding of those
games. The last concluding remark we wish to make is that
although the proposed FE approach is believed to have made
a big step towards making cognitive radio practical, there
are indeed challenging issues remained to be addressed. One
is the relatively slow convergence speed to FE that needs
improving. Another is the performance fluctuation for all
users before convergence for any game-theoretic approaches.
During the cycles of updating the strategies from SUs before
convergence, the PUs are not protected. It is hoped that this
paper can spark more interest on these issues.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The problem (20) can be solved by introducing the Lagrange
multiplier λ, using a Lagrangian multiplier formulation
L =
N∑
n=1
ln
(
1+ pk [n]
cBk (pk ,p
t−k )[n]
)
− λ
(
N∑
n=1
pk [n]− Pk
)
.
(68)
To proceed, we first obtain (69), as shown at the top of
the next page. Then by setting ∂L
∂pk [n]
∣∣∣
pk [n]=pt+1k [n]
= 0
(which is the necessary condition for the maximization), and
using the definitions x tk [n] , cBk (p
t+1
k ,p
t−k )[n] and ytk [n] ,
∂cBk [n]
∂pk [n]
∣∣∣∣
pk [n]=pt+1k [n]
, we get
pt+1k [n] =
(
1
λ
x tk [n]− (x tk [n])2
1
λ
ytk [n]+ x tk [n]
)+
, (70)
where (·)+ ensures the positiveness of the power. Finally,
renaming 1
λ
as wtk yields the desired result.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Given that we have p∗κ at the SE, we consider a power
allocation strategy, p˜κ that deviates from p∗κ such that p˜κ [l] =
p∗κ [l] ∀l 6= m, n, but p˜κ [n] = p∗κ [n] + 1p > 0 and p˜κ [m] =
p∗κ [m]−1p > 0 for some 1 ≤ m 6= n ≤ N and small1p > 0.
Denote the interference patterns for p∗κ and p˜κ , respectively,
as Iκ and I˜κ . Then we can write I˜κ [n] = Iκ [n] + 1I [n] and
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∂L
∂pk [n]
= 1
1+ pk [n]
cBk (pk ,p
t−k )[n]
cBk (pk ,pt−k )[n]− pk [n] ∂c
B
k (pk ,p
t−k )[n]
∂pk [n]
(cBk (pk ,p
t−k )[n])2
− λ (69)
log2
(
1+ p
∗
κ [n]+1p
c∗κ [n]+1I [n]
)
− log2
(
1+ p
∗
κ [n]
c∗κ [n]
)
+ log2
(
1+ p
∗
κ [m]−1p
c∗κ [m]+1I [m]
)
− log2
(
1+ p
∗
κ [m]
c∗κ [m]
)
≤ 0 (71)
(
c∗κ [n]+1I [n]+ p∗κ [n]+1p
c∗κ [n]+1I [n]
)(
c∗κ [n]
c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
)(
c∗κ [m]+1I [m]+ p∗κ [m]−1p
c∗κ [m]+1I [m]
)(
c∗κ [m]
c∗κ [m]+ p∗κ [m]
)
≤ 1 (72)
I˜κ [m] = Iκ [m] + 1I [m] for some small 1I [n],1I [m] 6= 0.
As user κ’s rate is maximized by p∗κ at SE, we therefore have
Rκ (p˜κ ) − Rκ (p∗κ ) ≤ 0 implying (71), as shown at the top of
this page. This can further be simplified to (72), as shown at
the top of this page, which can be rewritten as(
1+ 1p+1I [n]
c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
)(
1− 1p+1I [m]
c∗κ [m]+ p∗κ [m]
)
≤
(
1+ 1I [n]
c∗κ [n]
)(
1− 1I [m]
c∗κ [m]
)
. (73)
Now, using (73) and noting that it is valid also after swapping
m and n because subcarrier indicesm and n are arbitrary, it can
be easily shown after some manipulations that(
1− (1I [n]+1p)
2
(c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n])2
)(
1− (1I [m]+1p)
2
(c∗κ [m]+ p∗κ [m])2
)
≤
(
1− 1I [n]
2
(c∗κ [n])2
)(
1− 1I [m]
2
(c∗κ [m])2
)
∀m, n. (74)
Therefore, we must have
|1p+1I [n]|
c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
≥ |1I [n]|
c∗κ [n]
∀n. (75)
Since1p > 0, we analyze the following three possible cases:
Case 1: If 1I [n] > 0, then we have
1p+1I [n]
c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
≥ 1I [n]
c∗κ [n]
⇒ c
∗
κ [n]
p∗κ [n]
≥ 1I [n]
1p
> 0.
(76)
Case 2: If 1I [n] ≤ 0 and 1p+1I [n] ≥ 0, then
1p+1I [n]
c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
≥ −1I [n]
c∗κ [n]
⇒ 0 ≥ 1I [n]
1p
≥ − c
∗
κ [n]
2c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
. (77)
Case 3: If 1I [n] ≤ 0 and 1p+1I [n] < 0, then
−1p−1I [n]
c∗κ [n]+ p∗κ [n]
≥ −1I [n]
c∗κ [n]
⇒ (+ve) c
∗
κ [n]
p∗κ [n]
≤ 1I [n]
1p
(−ve), (78)
which is impossible, so this case is prohibited.
Taking ϕ∗κ [n] = lim1p→0 1I [n]1p and summarizing the above,
we get the desired result of (39).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
From our FWF analysis, it can be seen that at any time (with
the time index omitted for brievity)
∂L
∂pκ [n]
= cκ [n]− ϕκ [n]pκ [n]
cκ [n](cκ [n]+ pκ [n]) − λ. (79)
Together with the condition ϕκ [n] ≤ 0 < cκ [n]pκ [n] in Theorem 2,
∃λ > 0 such that ∂L
∂p∗κ [n]
= 0. On the other hand, for pκ [n] >
0, we have wκ = ηκ [n]+ pκ [n], giving
wκ = (cκ [n])
2 + ϕκ [n](pκ [n])2
cκ [n]− ϕκ [n]pκ [n] + pκ [n]. (80)
In [24, Proposition 1], it is known that in SE, ϕ∗κ [n] is a
constant and hence ∂ϕ
∗
κ [n]
∂pκ [n]
= 0. If this is true not just at SE
but at any time, then we get (81), as shown at the top of
the next page. From the condition in Theorem 2, we have
cκ [n] − ϕκ [n]pκ [n] ≥ 0 and also ϕκ [n] ≥ − cκ [n]2cκ [n]+pκ [n] .
Therefore,
∂wκ
∂pκ [n]
≥
(
− cκ [n]2cκ [n]+pκ [n]
)
(2cκ [n]+ pκ [n])+ cκ [n]
(+ve) = 0.
(82)
Knowing that ∂L
∂pκ [n]
= 1wκ − λ, we have
∂2L
∂(pκ [n])2
= −
(
1
wκ
)2
∂wκ
∂pκ [n]
≤ 0, (83)
which shows thatL is a concave function in {pk [n]}, after con-
sidering the interaction from other users via the interference
derivative of SE (39) and thus has a unique maximum.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
We start by writing the per-interaction interference
derivative,7 lim1p∗k [n]→0
1I∗k [n]
1p∗k [n]
, as (84) (see next page),
where (a) is due to lim1p∗k [n]→0
1I∗i [n]
1p∗k [n]
= θki[n] because high-
order interactions are ignored, (b) is because the derivative is
7In FE, ϕ∗k [n] 6= lim1p→0 1I [n]1p (in Theorem 1) because the higher-order
interactions need to be included in ϕ∗k [n].
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∂wκ
∂pκ [n]
= (cκ [n]− ϕκ [n]pκ [n])(2cκ [n]ϕκ [n]+ 2pκ [n]ϕκ [n])− ((cκ [n])
2 + ϕκ [n](pκ [n])2)(ϕκ [n]− ϕκ [n])
(cκ [n]− ϕκ [n]pκ [n])2 + 1
= 2cκ [n]ϕκ [n]+ ϕκ [n]pκ [n]+ cκ [n]
cκ [n]− ϕκ [n]pκ [n] (81)
lim
1p∗k [n]→0
1I∗k [n]
1p∗k [n]
= lim
1p∗k [n]→0
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik [n]
1p∗i [n]
1p∗k [n]
= lim
1p∗k [n]→0
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])θik [n]
1p∗i [n]
1I∗i [n]
1I∗i [n]
1p∗k [n]
(a)≈ lim
1p∗k [n]→0
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])sgn(p∗k [n])θik [n]θki[n]
1p∗i [n]
1I∗i [n]
(b)≥ − lim
1p∗k [n]→0
K∑
i=1
i 6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])sgn(p∗k [n])θik [n]θki[n]
∣∣∣∣1p∗i [n]1I∗i [n]
∣∣∣∣
(c)≥ − lim
1p∗k [n]→0
K∑
i=1
i6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])sgn(p∗k [n])θik [n]θki[n] (84)
negative (see the discussion before Proposition 1), (c) is due
to the belief that
∣∣∣1p∗i [n]1I∗i [n] ∣∣∣ ≤ 1, and (84) gives a lower bound
of the per-interaction environmental derivative. To justify the
belief (c), we infer that ideally for subcarrier n on which
user k occupies, i.e., pk [n] > 0, this should not be chosen
by other users i 6= k , or pi[n] ≈ 0 ∀i 6= k . In this
case, the strategic noise becomes ηi[n] ≈ ci[n], so user i
effectively employs an NE approach on that subcarrier and
the belief is true according to the result in Appendix E. Using
Theorem 2 to ensure user k achieving the highest rate, the per-
interaction interference derivative must satisfy (39) and this
can be achieved by making the lower bound in (84) satisfy
− lim
1p∗k [n]→0
K∑
i=1
i6=k
sgn(p∗i [n])sgn(p∗k [n])θik [n]θki[n]
≥ − c
∗
k [n]
2c∗k [n]+ p∗k [n]
, (85)
which directly gives the result (47).
APPENDIX E
JUSTIFICATION OF (C ) IN THE PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
To begin, we find it useful to define Li ,
∑N
m=1 1(wi >
Ii[n] + σi[n]) and L¯i , ∑Nm=1 1(wi ≥ Ii[n] + σi[n]) ≥ Li,
where 1(A) returns 1 if the event A is true or 0 otherwise,
so for some user i, we have
Pi = Liwi −
N∑
m=1
(Ii[n]+ σi[n])1(wi > Ii[n]+ σi[n]), (86)
Pi = L¯iwi −
N∑
m=1
(Ii[n]+ σi[n])1(wi ≥ Ii[n]+ σi[n]). (87)
We first present the following lemma before we present the
main result in the next lemma.
Lemma 2: The rate of change of the water-level w.r.t. the
interference pattern satisfies
0 ≤ ∂wi
∂Ii[n]
≤ 1
Li
. (88)
Proof: To show the result, we study what will happen
following an infinitesimal change in the interference pattern
on subcarrier n under different cases. In our proof, we use the
fact that the change in the interference pattern is infinitesi-
mally small and as such the subcarriers whether user i occu-
pies or not will not change except those subcarriers where the
water-level equals the overall noise before the change.
Case 1: If wi < Ii[n]+ σi[n] before the change, then it was
not used by user i. After the change 1Ii[n](→ 0),
subcarrier n will remain unused by user i and thus
the water-level is unchanged, or ∂wi
∂Ii[n]
= 0.
Case 2: If wi > Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, then sub-
carrier n was used by user i. After an increase in the
interference 1Ii[n] > 0 (but→ 0), the water-level
wi will increase and those subcarriers, m 6= n, that
previously satisfied wi = Ii[m]+ σi[m] will then be
used. Hence, we can use (87) to get
∂wi
∂Ii[n]+
= 1
L¯i
, (89)
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where the notation ∂Ii[n]+ specifies that the change
is positive (or increasing).
Case 3: If wi > Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, then as
in Case 2 subcarrier n was used by user i. After a
decrease in the interference 1Ii[n] < 0 (but→ 0),
the water-level wi will decrease and whether the
subcarriers are occupied or not by user i will not
change. Hence, we use (86) to get
∂wi
∂Ii[n]−
= 1
Li
, (90)
where the notation ∂Ii[n]− specifies that the change
is negative (or decreasing).
Case 4: If wi = Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, it was not
used by user i. After an increase in the interference
1Ii[n] > 0 (but → 0), subcarrier n will remain
unused and the water-level unchanged, or ∂wi
∂Ii[n]+ =
0.
Case 5: If wi = Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, it was not
used by user i. After a decrease in the interference
1Ii[n] < 0 (but → 0), subcarrier n will then be
used by user i while the status of other subcarriers
remain the same. Therefore, using (86), we have
∂wi
∂Ii[n]−
= 1
Li + 1 . (91)
Summarizing the results for all five cases gives the desired
result in (88). 
Lemma 3: The rate of change of the power allocation for
Nash user i w.r.t. the interference satisfies
−1 ≤ 1
L¯i
− 1 ≤ ∂pi[n]
∂Ii[n]
= ∂p
NE
i [n]
∂Ii[n]
≤ 0. (92)
Proof:With user i being Nash-like, its power allocation
is given by
pi[n] = pNEi [n] = (wi − Ii[n]− σi[n])+. (93)
Case 1: If wi < Ii[n]+ σi[n] before the change, then it was
not used by user i or pi[n] = 0. After the change
1Ii[n](→ 0), subcarrier n will remain unused and
pi[n] = 0 is unchanged so ∂pi[n]∂Ii[n] = 0.
Case 2: If wi > Ii[n]+σi[n] before the change, then pi[n] =
wi − Ii[n]− σi[n]. Therefore, we have
∂pi[n]
∂Ii[n]
= ∂wi
∂Ii[n]
− 1. (94)
After an increase in the interference1Ii[n] > 0 (but
→ 0), we have (89) so (94) becomes
∂pi[n]
∂Ii[n]+
= 1
L¯i
− 1. (95)
Case 3: If wi > Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, then as
in Case 2 we have (94). After a decrease in the
interference 1Ii[n] < 0 (but→ 0), we have (90)
which gives
∂pi[n]
∂Ii[n]−
= 1
Li
− 1. (96)
Case 4: If wi = Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, pi[n] = 0.
After an increase in the interference1Ii[n] > 0 (but
→ 0), subcarrier n will remain unused and pi[n] =
0 is unchanged, or ∂pi[n]
∂Ii[n]+ = 0.
Case 5: If wi = Ii[n] + σi[n] before the change, it was not
used by user i. After a decrease in the interference
1Ii[n] < 0 (but→ 0), subcarrier n will be used by
user i. Therefore, using (94) and (97) yields
∂pi[n]
∂Ii[n]−
= 1
Li + 1 − 1. (97)
Summarizing the results for all five cases gives the desired
result. 
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Consider the case with p∗k [n] > 0 because otherwise the
subcarrier is not used and p∗k [n] = 0. Using (44) and summing
over k = 1, 2, . . . ,K on both sides, we get
K∑
k=1
ϕ∗k [n]
(a)=
K∑
k=1
K∑
i=1
sgn(p∗i [n])
ϕ∗i [n]
θik [n]
∂I∗i [n]
∂p∗k [n]
(b)=
K∑
k=1
1
ϕ∗k [n]
K∑
i=1
sgn(p∗k [n])sgn(p∗i [n])θki[n]
× ∂I
∗
k [n]
∂p∗i [n]
ϕ∗k [n]
(c)= 1
ϕ∗k [n]
K∑
i=1
sgn(p∗k [n])sgn(p∗i [n])θki[n]
∂I∗k [n]
∂p∗i [n]
(98)(
ϕ∗k [n]
)2 (d)= K∑
i=1
sgn(p∗k [n])sgn(p∗i [n])θki[n]θik [n] (99)
where (a) is due to (44) and by defining θij[n] , 0 for i = j,
(b) is due to swapping the indices k and i, (c) is enforced by
equating the terms under the summations on both sides, which
allows us to decouple the interdependence of {ϕ∗k [n]}∀k and
thus makes possible a concise property to be derived, and (d)
is due to the subsystem response to the subject user k from
user i, i.e.,
∂I∗k [n]
∂p∗i [n]
= θik [n].
Now, using (47) on (99), we then get(
ϕ∗k [n]
)2 ≤ c∗k [n]
2c∗k [n]+ p∗k [n]
⇒ −
√
c∗k [n]
2c∗k [n]+ p∗k [n]
≤ ϕ∗k [n] ≤ 0. (100)
The negative is chosen to give (48) because ϕ∗k [n] ≤ 0.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We omit the time index t for brevity. To begin with, we find it
useful to define γk [n] ,
√
2ck [n]+pk [n]
ck [n]
so that ϕk [n] = − 1γk [n]
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due to the FWF in (49) and pk [n] = (γk [n])2ck [n] − 2ck [n].
Then, for those k, n such that pk [n] > 0, we have
wk [n] = (ck [n])
2 + ck [n]pk [n]
ck [n]− ϕ˜k [n]pk [n] =
ck [n]γk [n](γk [n]+ 1)
γk [n]+ 2 .
(101)
To see how wk [n] varies w.r.t. pk [n], we first obtain (102)
(see top of next page). Therefore, γk [n] increases as pk [n]
increases. On the other hand,
∂
(
γk [n]+1
γk [n]+2
)
∂γk [n]
= 1
(γk [n]+2)2 > 0 and
hence if pk [n] increases, then γk [n] will increase and therefore
γk [n]+1
γk [n]+2 will increase accordingly.
It remains to show that ck [n]γk [n] is also increas-
ing with pk [n]. To do so, we note that ck [n]γk [n] =√
2(ck [n])2 + pk [n]ck [n]. As a consequence, if ϕk [n] >
− ck [n]4ck [n]+pk [n] is satisfied, we obtain (103) (see top of next
page).
As a result, under the aforementioned condition, wk [n] is
increasing with pk [n]. Then following the same argument as
in the proof of Theorem 3 in Appendix C, FE is unique, and
the equilibrium is also optimal in maximizing the user’s rate,
which completes the proof.
APPENDIX H
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
In this proof, for convenience, we will omit the iteration
index t and assume that the change in the water-level wk is
negligible or the derivative in wk w.r.t. the change in ck is
zero. Also, note that |ρk [n]| = ∂ηk [n]∂Ik [n] =
∂ηk [n]
∂ck [n]
. For NE,
ηk [n] = ck [n] and therefore |ρk [n]| = 1.
In the case of SE, using (27) and the corresponding defini-
tion of ϕ in SE, we have
ηk [n] =
c2k [n]+
(
− ck [n]2ck [n]+pk [n]
)
p2k [n]
ck [n]+ ck [n]2ck [n]+pk [n]pk [n]
= ck [n]− pk [n]2 .
(104)
Then we have pk [n] = wk − ηk [n] = 2(wk − ck [n]) ⇒
∂pk [n]
∂ck [n]
= −2 and
∂ηk [n]
∂ck [n]
= 1− 1
2
∂pk [n]
∂ck [n]
= 2 ⇒ |ρk [n]| = 2. (105)
For the case of FE, we start by expressing (106) (see next
page). On the other hand, we can also examine ∂ϕk [n]
∂ck [n]
to obtain
∂ϕk [n]
∂ck [n]
= 1
2ϕk [n]
c2k [n]
(2ck [n]+ pk [n])2
pk [n]
c2k [n]
= 1
2
ϕ3k [n]
pk [n]
c2k [n]
.
(107)
Substituting this result into (106) then gives (108) (see top
of next page). For large pk [n]ck [n] ,
8 ϕk [n] = −
√
ck [n]
2ck [n]+pk [n] ≈
−
√
ck [n]
pk [n]
. Consequently, |ρk [n]| ≈ 12 |ϕk [n]| pk [n]ck [n] = 12
√
pk [n]
ck [n]
.
8As an approximate analysis, as far as FE is concerned, it makes more
sense to consider the case with high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) on a chosen
subcarrier because the user should choose only good subcarrier(s), or with
high SNR, to operate.
This completes the proof and knowing |ρk [n]| will be useful
in understanding the convergence behavior.
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
At the convergence of FE, it is easy to see that
w∗k
(a)= c
2
k [n]+ ck [n]pk [n]
ck [n]− ϕk [n]pk [n] (109)
(b)= c
2
k [n]+ ck [n]pk [n]
ck [n]+
√
ck [n]
2ck [n]+pk [n]pk [n]
> 0, (110)
where (a) is due to the assumption that pk [n] ≥ 0 and wk =
pk [n]+ ηk [n] and (b) is due to (49).
Now, considering the case ck [n] ≥ w∗k , we then get
ck [n] ≥ w∗k =
c2k [n]+ ck [n]pk [n]
ck [n]+
√
ck [n]
2ck [n]+pk [n]pk [n]
(111)
implying that
ck [n]
√
ck [n]
2ck [n]+ pk [n]pk [n] ≥ ck [n]pk [n], (112)
which is only true if pk [n] = 0. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX J
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Using (110), for those used subcarriers, the water-level of
AFE can be expressed as
w∗k =
ck [n]
(
1+ pk [n]ck [n]
)
1− ϕk [n] pk [n]ck [n]
. (113)
For high SNR, ϕk [n] ≈ −
√
ck [n]
pk [n]
. Plugging this into (113),
we obtain the desired result (64).
APPENDIX K
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Using Proposition 4, we have
(w∗k )2 ≈ ck [n]pk [n]sgn(pk [n]) =
pk [n]sgn(pk [n])
1/ck [n]
, (114)
which can then be rewritten as
(w∗k )2 ≈
∑
n pk [n]sgn(pk [n])∑
n
1
ck [n]
sgn(pk [n])
=
∑
n pk [n]sgn(pk [n])
1∑
n sgn(pk [n])∑
n
1
ck [n]
sgn(pk [n]) 1∑
n sgn(pk [n])
≈ E[pk [n]]
E
[
1
ck [n]
] .
(115)
Without loss of generality, we set E[|Hkk [n]|2] = 1,∀k, n.
Based on the anticipation that FE will make the users orthog-
onal (to be verified by simulation results in Section VII),
we therefore have E[ 1ck [n] ] = E[
|Hkk [n]|2
N0
] = 1N0 . In addition,
E[pk [n]] = P0 KN˜ . This completes the proof.
2546 VOLUME 7, 2019
J. Ren, K.-K. Wong: Cognitive Radio Made Practical: Forward-Lookingness and Calculated Competition
∂γk [n]
∂pk [n]
= 1
2
1√
2+ pk [n]ck [n]
∂
(
pk [n]
ck [n]
)
∂pk [n]
= 1
2
1√
2+ pk [n]ck [n]
1
ck [n]
(
1− pk [n]ϕk [n]
ck [n]
)
≥ 0 (∵ ϕk [n] ≤ 0) (102)
∂ck [n]γk [n]
∂pk [n]
= 1
2
1√
2(ck [n])2 + pk [n]ck [n]
[(4ck [n]+ pk [n])ϕk [n]+ ck [n]] > 0 (103)
∂ηk [n]
∂ck [n]
= c
2
k [n]− 2ck [n]ϕk [n]pk [n]+ ck [n] ∂ϕk [n]∂ck [n] p2k [n]− ϕk [n]p2k [n]+ c2k [n]
∂ϕk [n]
∂ck [n]
pk [n]
(ck [n]− ϕk [n]pk [n])2 (106)
∂ηk [n]
∂ck [n]
= c
2
k [n]− 2ck [n]ϕk [n]pk [n]+ 12ϕ3k [n]
p3k [n]
ck [n]
− ϕk [n]p2k [n]+ 12ϕ3k [n]p2k [n]
(ck [n]− ϕk [n]pk [n])2 (108)
APPENDIX L
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
From Corollary 1, it is known that pk [n] = 0 when ck [n] >
w∗k . Therefore, SU k will avoid the subcarrier, say n′, occupied
by the PUs if
ck [n′] = N0 + I˜k [n′] > w∗k . (116)
Then, using (65) in Proposition 5 and considering all subcar-
riers used by the PUs, we get (66).
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